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Abstract Miceli (1989), in a search for the optimal time to allow a broker
to market property, posits that the principal (seller) may use the
length of the listing contract to motivate the agent (listing broker)
to better align incentives. Expanding slightly on Miceli, this
work predicts that longer time allotted the broker to market
residential property will decrease broker effort, resulting in lower
search intensity and eventually a longer marketing span for
property, ceteris paribus. This prediction is borne out across three
empirical modeling methodologies commonly used in time-on-
market studies.
The unobservable nature of marketing property may allow the broker to shirk,
leading to a misalignment of incentives between an agent and his principal. This
leads to the obvious question of how the time contractually allotted a broker to
market property impacts the average selling time of these properties.1 Building
from the initial theoretical work of Miceli (1989), this research makes an original
empirical investigation into that question.
Miceli (1989) models the relationship between listing contract length, the tendency
for unobserved brokers to shirk, and the cost of ﬁnding another agent in the event
of marketing failure, along the way to developing an optimal listing contract
length. He develops most of the theoretical relationship between broker effort,
broker search intensity, arrival rates, and time on market needed for this present
work.2 However, a direct theoretical prediction between listing contract length and
property duration is not provided, most likely as the explanation of property
duration is not the main focus of his work.
This research expands slightly on Miceli (1989) capitalizing on both: (a) the
inverse relationship between arrival rates and property duration and (b) recently
available data on the time allotted a broker to market property to investigate the
relationship between listing contract length, hereafter often referred to as length
of contract or LOC, and residential property marketing time. In particular,
extending LOC leads to a decrease in broker effort, resulting in lower search
intensity on the broker’s part. This, in turn, leads to a lower probability of a sale272  Waller, Brastow, and Johnson
and, as duration estimates are the inverse of arrival rates, to an increase in property
marketing spans. In short, longer LOC leads to a longer time on market (TOM)
for properties, ceteris paribus. Empirical investigation employing a variety of
empirical methodologies veriﬁes this prediction.
The ﬁnding that extended listing contracts lead to longer marketing times provides
sellers of property a tool to better align their goals and those of the brokers they
hire. The next section discusses the relevant literature. Sections on theory,
methodology, data, empirical results, and concluding remarks follow.
 Literature
The property marketing duration literature covers a wide array of topics including
brokerage commissions (Zorn and Larsen, 1986), brokerage ﬁrm size (Yang and
Yavas, 1995), sales price (Yavas and Yang, 1995), list price changes (Knight,
2002), and relative property size (Turnbull, Dombrow, and Sirmans, 2006). Within
this body of literature, there is some agreement on the issue of joint determination
of property price and selling time stemming from original works by Belkin,
Hempel, and McLeavey (1976) and Miller (1978). However, the functional
relationship proffered and the empirical ﬁndings in this line of the literature are
quite often contradictory to one another. As an example of these contradictions,
Anglin, Rutherford, and Springer (2003), using a sample of withdrawn and sold
properties, argue and ﬁnd support for a positive relationship between list price
and property marketing time, while Turnbull and Dombrow (2007), using only
sold properties, ﬁnd support for an inverse relationship.
Additionally, there seems to be an ongoing disagreement over the preferred
modeling technique with some favoring direct OLS modeling. Munneke and Yavas
(2001), Rutherford, Springer, and Yavas (2001), and Allen and Dare (2004)
provide a sample of these works. A second group seems to prefer nonlinear
modeling techniques, with the Weibull distribution serving as the favorite
underlying distributional assumption within this group. Anglin, Rutherford, and
Springer (2003), Rutherford, Springer, and Yavas (2005), and Huang and
Rutherford (2007) serve as an excellent sample of this group. A third group of
authors appear to favor two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations in order to
better capture the joint determination of property price and selling time. Excellent
samples here include, but are not limited to, Knight (2002), Turnbull, Dombrow,
and Sirmans (2006), and Turnbull and Dombrow (2007).
To date, only three papers incorporate the time allotted a broker to market property
into their analysis. Miceli (1989), as mentioned above and discussed in further
detail below, is a purely theoretical piece seeking to outline an optimal contract
length. Asabere, Huffman, and Johnson (1996) test the effect of listing contract
length on sales price. The authors hypothesize that sellers’ opportunity costs
increase as time passes, leading to a reduction in reservation price. Their resultsListing Contract Length and Time on Market  273
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suggest that transaction price falls by .04% for each day that the listing nears
expiration. Clauretie and Daneshvary (2008) model principal-agent issues that
arise at the end of the listing contract period. They hypothesize that as a listing
contract nears expiration, brokers have an incentive to both work harder and
simultaneously persuade the seller to reduce their reservation price. Their
empirical analysis ﬁnds that transaction price falls as the listing contract nears
expiration, supporting the hypothesis that brokers encourage their sellers to accept
lower transaction prices as the listing contract nears expiration.
Building on Miceli’s (1989) theoretical principal-agent model and the empirical
listing contract work of Asabere, Huffman, and Johnson (1996) and Clauretie and
Daneshvary (2008), this paper extends the TOM literature by testing the
hypothesis that longer listing contracts result in longer TOM. Tests employed in
this paper follow the empirical TOM literature cited above.
 Theory3
Miceli (1989) investigates listing contract length as a mechanism to better align
brokers’ and sellers’ incentives. The work develops a partial equilibrium model
that balances listing contract length, the opportunity for brokers to shirk as a result
of asymmetric information, and the cost to sellers of ﬁnding another broker if the
property does not sell. From this equilibrium, Miceli derives an optimal listing
contract length dependent upon commissions, a seller’s reservation price, a seller’s
cost to search for another broker, and the instantaneous discount rate observed by
both sellers and brokers. As part of his work, Miceli develops a relationship
between listing contract length, broker effort, and broker search intensity.
Speciﬁcally, a Poisson distribution with arrival rate s is assumed for willing buyers
of any seller’s property with reservation price, R. Also, any broker’s search
intensity (s) is increasing in broker effort. Therefore, the probability of ﬁnding a
willing buyer is given by:
st   1  e , (1)
with  increasing in s. Furthermore, duration estimates are derived by inverting
. Thus, decreases in search intensity on the part of the listing broker brought
about by decreased effort will result in longer marketing spans, ceteris paribus.
Now combining the facts that the broker is assumed to be employed by the seller
under an exclusive right to sell for duration LOC (listing contract length),4
compensation  (0    1) is paid to the broker iff the property is sold, both
the seller and the broker face the common instantaneous discount rate (r), and the
probability of a sale at a given instant t is given by sest, the broker’s revenue
function can be written as:274  Waller, Brastow, and Johnson
LOC
(sr)t  sRed t . (2)
0
However, when marketing properties, brokers face costs, c(s), with c  0 and
c  0. Considering that these costs are only faced at any point in time if there
has not been a sale, the costs are weighted by the probability of no sale, est.
Thus, the broker’s cost function can be expressed as:
LOC
(sr)t  c(s)ed t . (3)
0
Combining Equations (2) and (3) reveals the broker’s objective proﬁt function:
LOC
(sr)t (s,T)  (sR  c(s))ed t . (4)
0
Integrating across the listing period reveals:
sR  c(s) (sr)LOC (s,T)  [1  e ]. (5)  s  r
Solving for the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to s and setting the marginal
cost of search intensity equal to marginal beneﬁts of greater effort (induced by
increased probability of earning a commission and earning that commission
sooner) determines the broker’s optimal level of search intensity for a given LOC.
(s*r)LOC LOCe 1 c(s*)  R  (s*  r)] [ s*R  c(s*)].  (s*r)LOC (1  e )
(6)5
More importantly to the work at hand, changes in the optimal level of search
intensity, s*, as induced by variation in listing contract length, is derived by way
of total differentiation. Speciﬁcally:Listing Contract Length and Time on Market  275
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22 2 s*/LOC  ( /sLOC)/( /s ). (7)
Satisfaction of the second-order conditions dictates that the denominator is
positive. Therefore, the effect of LOC on broker search intensity is dependent
upon the sign of the numerator, which is always negative for LOC  0.6 So, as
listing contract length increases, the optimal level of search intensity on the




Finally, returning to the search process (Equation 1), lower effort and
corresponding lower search intensity induced by providing the broker with an
extended time to market property results in lower probabilities of a sale, as  is
increasing in s. And, since the hazard function () is inversely related to duration
estimates, longer marketing spans should be observed. More succinctly, a longer
listing period negotiated between the broker and the seller results in a longer
marketing time due to less intensity of search, which is the central hypothesis of
this paper.
 Empirical Approach
Each of the property duration modeling techniques presented in the literature
review has advantages and disadvantages. OLS estimation allows for the ability
to test and make corrections for self-selection and is equally ﬂexible in dealing
with endogeneity issues.7 However, non-normal error terms can lead to biased
OLS coefﬁcient estimates, potentially rendering economic interpretation
meaningless. Hazard models, often assuming a Weibull distribution of property
marketing time, offer highly ﬂexible functional speciﬁcations and are an intuitively
appealing technique. Unfortunately, the aforementioned self-selection and
endogeneity problems, common features in TOM studies, are not so easily dealt
with in these models. Instrumental variables models, usually in the form of 2SLS,
allow for the joint estimation of simultaneously determined property price and
property selling time. With this technique, however, there are criticisms related to
the non-normality of the error term and the difﬁculty in calculating required
inverse Mills ratios (IMR) to control for self-selection issues between variables of
interest and property marketing time.
This present study does not seek to settle these empirical modeling issues. Instead,
all three methodologies are employed to maximize the robustness of any ﬁndings.
In particular, this study seeks to determine whether the central hypothesis (a longer276  Waller, Brastow, and Johnson
listing contract results in longer property marketing time) is consistent when tested
across all commonly applied econometric techniques. To that end, the following
general modeling framework is followed:
TOM  (X, L, Z, LOC, SP). (9) ii i i i i
ˆ SP  	(x, l, z, LOC). (10) ii i i i
Where TOMi and SPi are vectors for property marketing time and property selling
price; Xi and xi are vectors of property characteristics; Li and li are vectors for
location control; Zi and zi are vectors that include variables such as the degree of
over pricing and market condition; and LOCi, the variable of interest, is the length
of time provided by the seller to the broker to market the property.
Only Equation (9) is needed for the OLS and Weibull estimations. In the 2SLS
speciﬁcation, SPi is estimated in reduced form in Equation (10), with predicted
values, substituting for SPi in Equation (9). In a 2SLS setting, (9) and (10) ˆ SP, i
form the system of equations between property price and property marketing time.
Variables included in the TOM equation (vectors Xi, Li, and Zi) follow existing
literature and are discussed in the Empirical Results section. In the interest of
brevity, reduced form sales price results are not reported. As a reduced form
equation, variables in Equation (10) (vectors xi, li, and zi) include all vectors from
Equation (9) plus instruments for price.
Discussion of some of the speciﬁed regressors and other modeling issues is
warranted at this point. In order to properly specify the degree of overpricing
(DOP) as suggested in Anglin, Rutherford, and Springer (2003), a list price
equation is estimated. DOP is the residual from that estimation and represents the
percentage deviation of a property’s list price from the expected list price for a
typical property in the sample with the same characteristics.8 Also, when TOM
analysis is restricted to properties that have been sold, the duration data are
‘‘censored’’ (Anglin, Rutherford, and Springer, 2003). Therefore, the omission of
properties that are withdrawn by the seller or for which the contract expires
without a sale may result in an artiﬁcially reduced TOM in the data sample.
Accordingly, this study incorporates unsuccessfully marketed properties in the
hazard model (Weibull) analysis. Thus, four estimates (OLS, Weibull, Weibull
with Censoring, and 2SLS) of property duration are ultimately exhibited. Finally,
in order to control for market conditions, the average 30-year ﬁxed rate mortgage
rate at the sales date is speciﬁed as a proxy for market condition. Market rates
are determined in part by demand conditions for property and intuitively seem a
sound proxy for overall market conditions.
An additional issue to consider is the relationship between contract length and
TOM.9 Ex post, TOM cannot cause contract length simply because it occurs after
the contract is negotiated. Ex ante, however, expected TOM may inﬂuence optimalListing Contract Length and Time on Market  277
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contract length from both the broker’s and seller’s point of view. Note that
explanatory variables in a typical TOM equation are speciﬁed to control for factors
(e.g., property characteristics, location, market conditions, and degree of
overpricing) that would determine marketing time expectations of sellers and
brokers. Therefore, the coefﬁcient of LOC is an estimate of the partial effect of
listing contract length on marketing time, holding determinants of expected TOM
constant.
Additional details about the operational model forms of the three techniques are
omitted here as they can be determined from the reported empirical results
discussed below.
 Data
The data set for this paper is cross sectional and comes from a central Virginia
multiple listing service (MLS). Transactions occurred over eight quarters from
mid-2006 through mid-2008. After culling incomplete or miscoded data, the ﬁnal
sample consists of 3,502 properties, 2,186 of which were sold and 1,316 of which
were unsuccessful in their marketing attempt.10
The MLS data includes the date at which the contract was last extended, but no
information about whether the contract had been extended one or more times
previous to that date. For those properties, then, it is impossible to deﬁnitively
determine the original contract length and the number or length of additional
extensions. Therefore all properties for which the listing contract had been
extended were removed from the data set. An additional reason to exclude
properties with extended contracts was discussed above. When a contract is
extended, the seller and broker may use information from the property’s current
marketing effort when negotiating the length of the extension. That is, TOM can
cause LOC. Therefore, removing all observations for which the current contract
has been extended removes an element of potential endogeneity from the model.
Exhibit 1 cumulatively summarizes data for both SOLD (closed transactions) and
UNSOLD (unsuccessfully marketed) properties. Variables are brieﬂy explained in
Exhibit 2. SOLD properties had a signiﬁcantly lower list price ($180,000 compared
to $231,000), were smaller, were on smaller lots, and had fewer bedrooms and
baths than properties that were UNSOLD. Additionally, UNSOLD properties, not
surprisingly, were overpriced relative to the sample (DOP  .04). Finally,
properties that sold exhibited slightly longer listing contracts (166 days vs. 159).
The local real estate market slowed during the 2006–2008 sample period. There
were more properties on the market in the ﬁrst half of the period (2,247 in the
ﬁrst four quarters vs. 1,255 in the last four). Additionally, more properties sold in
the ﬁrst half (68.5% of the sales occurred in the ﬁrst four quarters and 31.5% in
the second), while the proportion of unsold properties were more evenly
distributed (57% of the UNSOLD properties occurred in the ﬁrst four quarters to278  Waller, Brastow, and Johnson
Exhibit 1  Descriptive Statistics
SOLD Properties UNSOLD Properties
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. t-Stat.
TOM 81.18 48.38 137.01 75.012 26.763
LOC 166.13 77.83 159.29 80.02 2.492
Selling Price 176249 93579
DOP 0.020 0.219 0.040 0.274 7.158
Square Feet 1848.62 762.76 2087.48 916.740 8.309
Age 27.548 27.482 26.737 33.946 0.773
Acreage 0.647 0.609 0.778 0.719 5.785
Bedrooms 3.141 0.770 3.284 0.868 5.068
Full Bathrooms 1.947 0.703 2.093 0.767 5.788
Half Bathrooms 0.412 0.527 0.464 0.537 2.801
Fire 0.623 0.485 0.660 0.474 2.213
Hardwood 0.536 0.499 0.559 0.497 1.302
Full basement 0.566 0.496 0.538 0.499 1.620
Vacant 0.340 0.474 0.305 0.461 2.095
30-Year FRM-SD 6.285 0.240
30-Year FRM-LD 6.332 0.241 6.335 0.246 0.370
Listing Price 179686 95846 231175 158079 12.001
Notes: Means, standard deviations, and t-tests for differences between the means for SOLD
(n  2,186) and UNSOLD (n  1,316) Properties.
43% in the second). Said another way, fewer properties were on the market and
a smaller percentage of them sold as the market slowed.
Exhibit 3 provides a frequency distribution of contract lengths and mean market
duration. Not surprisingly, UNSOLD properties were on the market longer across
all contract length categories. This result is also illustrated in average TOM
between SOLD and UNSOLD properties in Exhibit 1. As shown in Exhibit 3, a
plurality of listing contracts (1,077) exhibited durations between three and six
months, with an average TOM of just under 70 days. After consultation with
several brokers in the area covered by the MLS, there was agreement that these
contract lengths are representative for the time period examined.
Finally, the listing contract and TOM data used in this study represent the most
recent attempted sale of the home and do not reﬂect the full marketing history of
a property.11 However, by excluding properties that sold within a few days and
properties for which the current contract had been extended, and by incorporatingListing Contract Length and Time on Market  279
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Exhibit 2  Variable Legend
Variable Name Variable Deﬁnition
TOM Property time-on-market, days from list date to under contract date.
LOC Length of listing contract provided the broker to market property.
Selling Price Property transaction price.
DOP Degree of Overpricing as deﬁned in Anglin, Rutherford, and Springer (2003).
Square Feet Property size in square feet.
Age Property age in years.
Acreage Property acreage.
Bedrooms Number of bedrooms.
Full Bathrooms Number of full bathrooms.
Half Bathrooms Number of half bathrooms.
Fire 1 if the property has a ﬁreplace, 0 otherwise.
Hardwood 1 if the property has hardwood ﬂoors, 0 otherwise.
Full basement 1 if the property has a full basement, 0 otherwise.
Vacant 1 if the property is vacant, 0 otherwise.
30-Year FRM-LD 30-year ﬁxed rate mortgage at listing date.
30-Year FRM-SD 30-year ﬁxed rate mortgage at under contract date.
Listing Price Listing price of the property.
SOLD 1 if the property sold, 0 otherwise.
expired and withdrawn properties into the analysis, this research employs data that
minimize potential biases due to incomplete marketing histories.12
 Empirical Results
The results shown in Exhibit 4 provide support for this work’s central hypothesis
that a longer listing contract period, on average, results in a longer TOM. The
results are robust across each of the four analyses and demonstrate that LOC is a
positive and signiﬁcant determining factor in TOM.
Other results revealed in Exhibit 4 are generally consistent with prior studies. The
simultaneous determination of price and TOM is found to be inversely related, as
suggested by Turnbull and Dombrow (2007). The degree of overpricing (DOP),
which is generally a proxy for seller motivation, is positively related to TOM in
all results, and signiﬁcant in all but the 2SLS model, illustrating that overpriced
properties require longer marketing periods. This result is consistent with Anglin,
Rutherford, and Springer (2003). Variables that capture housing characteristics
have expected signs and are generally signiﬁcant in the OLS13 and Weibull280  Waller, Brastow, and Johnson










LOC  91 days 50.83 185 64.69 228
90  LOC  181 69.55 1,077 115.79 516
180  LOC  271 89.66 758 163.55 462
270  LOC  366 156.50 107 308.86 71
LOC  365 143.07 59 213.23 39
analyses. In the interest of brevity, a detailed discussion of these commonly found
effects is omitted.
In both Weibull models (middle columns of Exhibit 4) the coefﬁcient of LOC is
positive indicating that an increase in contract length increases TOM,o r ,
alternatively, decreases the hazard rate. However, direct comparison of the two
Weibull models is impossible because of required changes in speciﬁcation
(omission of sales price and replacement of the mortgage rate at sales date with
mortgage rate at list date) for the sample that includes unsold properties. A
speculative observation, however, is that signiﬁcance levels of the overall equation
and of two key explanatory variables (LOC and DOP) are higher for the model
that incorporates the impact of censoring. This is suggestive of support for the
conclusion by previous authors, such as Anglin, Rutherford, and Springer (2003),
that modeling the impact of censoring is a superior methodology.
The uniqueness of the 30-year mortgage rate (market condition proxy) and SOLD
and UNSOLD properties deserves some discussion in order to clarify the
measurement of this metric and understand its role in residential property
marketing duration. The 30-year mortgage rate displays a negative and signiﬁcant
effect in the OLS, Weibull, and 2SLS estimations; however, only a 10%
signiﬁcance level is produced in the latter. Rising rates in active markets are
generally associated with markets in which homes sell relatively quickly, making
30-Year FRM-SD a valid proxy control for market condition. Note that in the full
sample (censoring) Weibull model, the 30-year mortgage rate at the list date has
a negative but not signiﬁcant coefﬁcient. It might well be the case that market
rates are less likely to affect properties that did not successfully market. Perhaps,
these properties were simply overpriced. The difference between the DOP for
SOLD and UNSOLD properties in Exhibit 1 provides support for this possibility.
Returning to the variable of interest, LOC signiﬁcantly increases TOM, in the OLS
and 2SLS estimates (Exhibit 4), revealing about a 5% increase in TOM for each
10% increase in LOC.14 Similarly, the estimated Weibull coefﬁcients for LOC are





























































Exhibit 4  OLS, Weibull, and 2SLS Estimations of Property Duration
Dependent Variable: LnTOM
OLS t-value Weibull t-value
Weibull–
w/Censoring t-value 2SLS t-value
Constant 8.40 5.35*** 1.90 6.20*** 0.46 6.52*** 45.97 1.27
LN(LOC) 0.52 19.05*** 0.14 28.73*** 0.17 49.73*** 0.53 16.22***
LN(Selling Price) 0.81 3.74*** 0.13 3.22*** 6.34 1.19
DOP 0.85 3.73*** 0.14 3.26*** 0.02 3.94*** 6.38 1.20
LN(Square Feet) 0.71 4.35*** 0.12 3.90*** 0.04 5.85*** 4.64 1.37
LN(Age) 0.18 5.48*** 0.03 4.45*** 0.006 4.73*** 0.98 1.42
LN(Acreage) 0.01 1.46 0.001 0.69 0.0002 0.18 0.11 1.33
Bedrooms 0.04 1.98** 0.009 2.58*** 0.002 0.95 0.19 1.30
Full Bathrooms 0.07 2.38** 0.011 2.04** 0.006 2.03** 0.43 1.24
Half Bathrooms 0.04 1.62 0.007 1.54 0.0002 0.07 0.33 1.19
Fire 0.11 2.63*** 0.018 2.34** 0.005 1.43 0.90 1.18
Hardwood 0.10 3.46*** 0.018 3.19*** 0.003 1.24 0.59 1.26
Full basement 0.03 1.17 0.002 0.45 0.011 3.92*** 0.29 1.16





























Exhibit 4  (continued)
OLS, Weibull, and 2SLS Estimations of Property Duration
Dependent Variable: LnTOM
OLS t-value Weibull t-value
Weibull–
w/Censoring t-value 2SLS t-value
30-Year FRM-
SD
0.28 4.40*** 0.05 4.76*** 0.19 1.77*
30-Year FRM-LD 0.0003 0.04
N 2,186 2,186 3,502 2,186
F 26.06
R2 .2662 .2560
Chi Sq. 1,688.61 3,965.82 647.99
Notes: Time trend and location controls have been suppressed for the purpose of exposition. SP is instrumented and speciﬁed as (not LnSP) in the 2SLS ˆ LnSP
model. All models use Huber-White robust standard errors in the estimation of t-statistics. Both Weibull models employ the accelerated failure time metric.
*Signiﬁcant at the .10 level.
**Signiﬁcant at the .05 level.





























































Exhibit 5  OLS, Weibull, and 2SLS Estimations of Property Duration
Dependent Variable: LnTOM
Categories of LOC
OLS t-value Weibull t-value
Weibull–
w/Censoring t-value 2SLS t-value
Constant 11.62 7.00*** 2.94 8.73*** 1.39 17.01*** 42.74 1.15
LOC  91 Days 0.74 8.69*** 0.19 11.97*** 0.21 18.33*** 0.76 8.54***
LOC 91 to 180 Days 0.45 5.46*** 0.12 7.40*** 0.12 11.37*** 0.46 5.40***
LOC 181 to 270 Days 0.26 3.17*** 0.07 4.27*** 0.06 5.69*** 0.25 3.07***
LOC 271 to 365 Days 0.14 1.34 0.03 1.60 0.04 3.73*** 0.15 1.48
LN(Selling Price) 0.81 3.51*** 0.15 3.23*** 5.38 1.15
DOP 0.83 3.46*** 0.15 3.18*** 0.01 2.03** 5.40 1.15
LN(Square Feet) 0.72 4.17*** 0.14 3.92*** 0.04 5.21*** 3.96 1.19
LN(Age) 0.19 5.27*** 0.03 4.70*** 0.007 4.72*** 0.85 1.25
LN(Acreage) 0.02 1.50 0.001 0.76 0.0005 0.40 0.10 1.16
Bedrooms 0.04 2.08** 0.009 2.45** 0.003 1.12 0.17 1.29
Full Bathrooms 0.07 2.19** 0.011 1.91* 0.006 1.71* 0.36 1.19
Half bathrooms 0.04 1.56 0.006 1.13 0.002 0.56 0.28 1.14
Fire 0.11 2.53** 0.017 2.03** 0.009 2.15** 0.76 1.13
Hardwood 0.10 3.15*** 0.018 2.78*** 0.001 0.36 0.50 1.21
Full basement 0.02 0.80 0.002 0.34 0.013 3.61*** 0.23 1.06





























Exhibit 5  (continued)
OLS, Weibull, and 2SLS Estimations of Property Duration
Dependent Variable: LnTOM
Categories of LOC
OLS t-value Weibull t-value
Weibull–
w/Censoring t-value 2SLS t-value
30-Year FRM-SD 0.34 4.96*** 0.07 6.00*** 0.26 2.73***
30-Year FRM-LD 0.003 0.32
N 2,186 2,186 3,502 2,186
F 22.70
R2 .2662
Chi Sq. 1,284.63 2,833.49 574.3
Notes: Time trend and location controls have been suppressed for the purpose of exposition. SP is instrumented and speciﬁed as (not LnSP) in the 2SLS ˆ LnSP
model. All models use Huber-White robust standard errors in the estimation of t-statistics. Both Weibull models employ the accelerated failure time metric.
*Signiﬁcant at the .10 level.
**Signiﬁcant at the .05 level.
***Signiﬁcant at the .01 level.Listing Contract Length and Time on Market  285
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are much smaller than those estimated in the OLS and 2SLS regressions,
suggesting that those models may overstate the impact of longer contracts.
Differences in magnitude between estimated coefﬁcients of Weibull models and
OLS or 2SLS have been noted by other authors including Allen, Faircloth, and
Rutherford (2005). However, the results are robust across commonly-used
methodologies and provide a preponderance of statistical evidence in support of
the central hypothesis that increasing the time allotted a broker to market property
results in increased property selling time.
Additional detail on the impact of varying contract lengths on TOM is provided
by creating categorical variables for LOC (results are reported in Exhibit 5).
Categorical variables were created for contracts less than 91 days, 91 to 180 days,
181 to 270 days, 271 to 365 days, and greater than 365 days (the omitted category
in all results). OLS estimates illustrate the common result found across all four
techniques. Properties with the shortest contracts ( 91 days) had the shortest
TOM, ceteris paribus, relative to properties with contracts greater than one year.
TOM increases as LOC categories increase up to 270 days. The 271 to 365 day
category shows longer TOM than the  365-day category, but the difference in
coefﬁcients of the two longest contract categories is not statistically signiﬁcant.
These results are suggestive that listing contract length exhibits a declining
marginal effect on property marketing spans. These empirical results extend
beyond Miceli’s (1989) model and may warrant further research.
These results as a whole represent an empirical conﬁrmation of Miceli’s (1989)
model and are therefore entirely consistent with the hypothesis that length of the
listing contract can be an effective tool to align broker and seller incentives.
 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the time-on-market literature by empirically
investigating, for the ﬁrst time, the relationship between length of listing contract
and time-on-market. While the theoretical foundation for this study was put in
place almost two decades ago, the recent availability of data concerning the time
allotted a broker to market a property now makes this study possible. This work
hypothesizes that extending the listing contract period results in a decrease in
broker effort, resulting in lower search intensity on the broker’s part and
corresponding lower arrival rates, and, as duration estimates are the inverse of
arrival rates, an increase in marketing time. Empirical investigation of this central
hypothesis across a variety of methodologies veriﬁes this relationship.
These results contribute to the rich literature on principal-agent incentive
misalignments in real estate brokerage by examining the impact of listing contract
length. Empirical research on listing contracts, which began with Asabere,
Huffman, and Johnson (1996) and extended by Clauretie and Daneshvary (2008),
focus on pricing issues as contracts expire, while this study concentrates on overall
marketing time.286  Waller, Brastow, and Johnson
The ﬁndings help to further the understanding of the unique relationship between
property sellers and their brokers, hopefully providing both sellers and brokers
alike with needed information to assist them in the listing and selling process.
This additional insight into the effect of listing contract length may help to better
align broker and seller incentives. However, several interesting questions regarding
the length of the listing contract remain unanswered, including the
interrelationships between listing contract length and probability that a home will
sell, the impact of dual agency, and the degree of overpricing.
 Endnotes
1 In this paper, the term broker is used generically for all licensees including brokers and
agents.
2 Time on market, property marketing time, selling time, marketing span, and duration
are used as synonyms in this work.
3 Notation employed in this work closely, but not exclusively, follows Miceli (1989) for
ease of comparison.
4 Here LOC is the equivalent of the termination date of the listing. In Miceli (1989), T is
its analog. Therefore, a listing period encompasses the time period t0 to LOC.
5 See Endnote 15 in Miceli (1989) for an explanation of second order conditions.
6 Again, see Equation (5) in Miceli (1989) for a more exacting explanation.
7 That is to say, Heckman and Hausman tests for self-selection and endogeneity are easily
incorporated into OLS estimations of property duration.
8 Results of the list price regression are not reported here but are available from the authors
upon request.
9 The authors thank anonymous referees for raising this issue.
10 The authors are indebted to an anonymous referee for pointing out that properties which
are on the market for an extremely short time [aka: NOMARKET or QUICK—see
Sirmans, Turnbull, and Dombrow (1995)] may be the result of unrepresentative
marketing and inclusion of these properties may bias analysis of the length of contract—
TOM relationship. Therefore, the properties with extremely short TOM are deleted from
the sample.
11 For instance, an alternative explanation for a positive relationship between LOC and
TOM would be that a property’s unique marketing history, if known by the seller or
broker, could inﬂuence current expected marketing time and, therefore, contract length.
If a property was known to have sold slowly in the past, expectations of current
marketing time might be inﬂuenced and a longer listing contract could be in the interest
of both seller and broker. If past marketing time is speciﬁc to the property (rather than
due to market conditions that existed at that time) and those unique property
characteristics are not perfectly captured by property and market control variables, then
some of this effect may be captured by the LOC coefﬁcient.
12 As for past marketing histories of property, this work explicitly assumes, as all prior
duration studies implicitly assume, that any error induced by the omissions of property
marketing histories is independent and identically-distributed and thereby does not
impact the overall distribution of property marketing time. In short, the authors of thisListing Contract Length and Time on Market  287
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work recognize the inherent data issues and the implied limitation in this type of work
but choose to continue property duration research as it is important to gain an increased
understanding of this key market outcome.
13 To address the potential for sample selection bias in the OLS estimate, the authors
conduct a two-stage Heckman procedure. Results, not reported here but available upon
request, are not materially different from the reported OLS speciﬁcation.
14 During the course of this study, numerous alternative speciﬁcations across all three
estimation techniques were speciﬁed and exhibited robustness with the model results
presented herein. Additionally, a previous version of this study employed data from a
different MLS. That data set was comprised of only properties that sold, making it
impossible to correct for selection bias in OLS regressions or censoring in Weibull. We
are indebted to an anonymous referee who suggested we ﬁnd a more complete data set.
Results from the original data provide additional evidence of the robustness of the
reported results across different times, different locales, and different empirical
techniques. Speciﬁcally, LOC was a positive and statistically signiﬁcant predictor of
TOM in OLS, Weibull and 2SLS regressions. These estimations are available upon
request from the authors.
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